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1122 
Note 
 
OVERBEY V. MAYOR OF BALTIMORE: THE COST OF SILENCE 
AND THE IMPACT OF RESTRICTING SPEECH IN POLICE 
BRUTALITY SETTLEMENTS 
DELANEY E. ANDERSON* 
Can the government purchase silence from a someone who its agents 
beat, shocked with a stun gun, and ridiculed?1  According to Supreme Court 
precedent and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, no.2  
In Overbey v. Mayor of Baltimore,3 the Fourth Circuit answered the 
important question of whether the government may impose content-specific 
speech restrictions in the context of settlement agreements.4  Implicit in the 
court’s reasoning is the underlying goal of self-fulfillment in First 
Amendment speech protections.5  Through an analysis of First Amendment 
precedent, the court accurately captured the importance of protecting speech 
describing an individual’s personal experience of government abuse.6 
In Overbey, the court analyzed whether the use of a non-disparagement 
clause, prohibiting Ashley Overbey from speaking about her experience of 
police brutality, was an enforceable waiver of her First Amendment rights.7  
                                                          
© 2020 Delaney E. Anderson 
* J.D. Candidate, 2021, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law.  The 
author wishes to thank Professor Leslie Meltzer Henry for her invaluable guidance, as well as the 
Maryland Law Review editors, particularly Bianca Spinosa and Hunter Haines, for their thoughtful 
feedback and editing.  The author also wishes to thank her family and mentors for fostering a love 
of writing and providing unwavering support.  
 1.  See Overbey v. Mayor of Baltimore, 930 F.3d 215, 220 (4th Cir. 2019) (presenting these 
facts). 
 2.  Id. at 226.  
 3.  930 F.3d 215, 220 (4th Cir. 2019).  
 4.  See infra Section IV.A.  A settlement agreement occurs when a defendant offers something 
(usually monetary compensation) to a plaintiff so that the plaintiff “agrees not to disclose evidence 
that could establish the [defendant’s] liability to others.”  Alan E. Garfield, Promises of Silence: 
Contract Law and Freedom of Speech, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 261, 271 (1998).  Ultimately, the 
defendant “seeks to suppress information that could expose it to civil liability.”  Id.  A content-
specific speech restriction is when the government seeks to silence certain speech based on the 
content expressed by the speech.  See Rebecca A. Taylor, The First Amendment, AM. BAR ASS’N: 
GPSOLO EREPORT, July 2014, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/gpsolo/publications/gpsolo_ 
ereport/2014/july_2014/the_first_amendment/. 
 5.  See infra Section IV.C. 
 6.  See infra Section IV.C.  
 7.  Overbey, 930 F.3d at 221–22. 
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In effect, the government sought to purchase silence to prevent critique from 
reaching the public consciousness with “hush money.”8  While an individual 
may waive a constitutional right, that waiver is not enforceable unless strong 
public policy interests support its enforcement.9  The court correctly held that 
the foundational public policy interests in open public debate and government 
mistrust were superior to the government’s interest in efficiency and 
minimizing critique.10  The court’s reasoning was consistent with the 
Supreme Court’s protective First Amendment jurisprudence, and the court, 
by implication, affirmed the importance of protecting the speech of 
marginalized individuals that is critical of the government, especially 
experiences of police brutality.11 
Expanding on the court’s correct decision and the resulting implications, 
this Note will analyze the case, the underlying precedent, the court’s 
reasoning, and the court’s application of relevant precedent and First 
Amendment theory.12  Part I of this Note will describe the case before the 
Fourth Circuit, including Overbey’s experience, Baltimore City’s response, 
and the United States District Court for the District of Maryland’s decision.13  
Part II will then discuss the relevant legal precedent underlying the court’s 
decision.14  This Part will explore the First Amendment jurisprudence related 
to content-specific speech restrictions on speech that is critical of the 
government, the supremacy of First Amendment interests over competing 
interests, and the free speech jurisprudence related to self-fulfillment and 
self-respect.15  Part III will follow the court’s reasoning that led to its 
conclusion that the non-disparagement agreement was an unconstitutional 
waiver of Overbey’s First Amendment right, as well as Judge Quattlebaum’s 
dissenting opinion.16  Finally, Part IV will explore the relationship between 
the court’s decision and government-critical speech protections, the policies 
underlying the First Amendment, and the freedom of speech of marginalized 
communities.17 
                                                          
 8.  Id. at 226. 
 9.  Id. at 223.  
 10.  Id. at 224, 226.  
 11.  See infra Part IV.  
 12.  See infra Parts I–IV. 
 13.  See infra Part I.  
 14.  See infra Part II.  
 15.  See infra Part II. 
 16.  See infra Part III. 
 17.  See infra Part IV. 
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I. THE CASE 
In April 2012, police officers from the Baltimore City Police 
Department physically attacked, degraded, and arrested Ms. Ashley Overbey, 
all because she called 911 fearing someone had burglarized her home.18  
Unfortunately, this fear was not assuaged by police presence.19  Instead of 
the protection Overbey anticipated, the police physically assaulted and 
arrested Overbey.20  Overbey sued the City to recover for her mistreatment 
and its impact on her livelihood.21  As a result of her arrest, Overbey was 
unable to find a job, pay her bills, or maintain housing for her and her 
children.22  In the interest of a prompt conclusion to this traumatic incident, 
Overbey agreed to a settlement of $63,000 with a caveat in the form of a non-
disparagement clause that prevented her from speaking about “‘any opinions, 
facts or allegations in any way connected to’ her case.”23  If Overbey 
discussed her experience with Baltimore Police Department, she would be 
required to remit half of her settlement back to the City.24  The City, however, 
remained free to speak about the case, Overbey, and her claims.25 
While the settlement was pending approval by the City, a news article 
from The Baltimore Sun released information about the settlement and 
Overbey.26  The article quoted the City Solicitor describing Overbey as 
“hostile” with police and suggesting that she caused her own mistreatment.27  
Internet commenters made many negative and disparaging comments on the 
article about Overbey.28  The internet commenters, following the City 
Solicitor’s sentiment and utilizing racist rhetoric, accused Overbey of 
                                                          
 18.  Brief for Petitioner at 4, Overbey v. Mayor of Baltimore, 930 F.3d 215 (4th Cir. 2019) (No. 
17-2444).  
 19.  Id.  
 20.  Overbey, 930 F.3d at 220.  
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id.  
 23.  Id.  The settlement agreement included Overbey, the three officers who physically 
assaulted and arrested her, and the City.  Id.  The City’s use of non-disparagement clauses in police 
misconduct settlements required claimants “promise not to speak to the media about either their 
underlying allegations or the settlement process” and were included in ninety-five percent of the 
City’s police misconduct settlement agreements.  Id. at 219–20. 
 24.  Id. at 220. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Id.; see Luke Broadwater, City to Pay $63K to Woman Police Shocked with Taser, BALT. 
SUN (Sept. 15, 2014), https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/crime/bs-xpm-2014-09-15-bal-city-to-
pay-63k-to-woman-police-shocked-with-taser-20140909-story.html.  This article has been edited 
since its original posting and all comments have been turned off.  Id.  
 27.  Overbey, 930 F.3d at 220; see Brief for Petitioner, supra note 18, at 8 (“Accompanying the 
information about her settlement was an explanatory statement by the City Solicitor that, in 
substance, pinned blame for Ms. Overbey’s altercation with the police on Ms. Overbey herself, 
characterizing her disposition as ‘hostile’ to the responding police officers.”).  
 28.  Overbey, 930 F.3d at 220. 
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instigating the altercation to gain a settlement from the police.29  Overbey 
responded to some comments to defend herself and explained how the police 
harmed her.30  The City then provided Overbey with only half of her 
settlement, withholding the other half as “liquidated damages” for her 
violation of the settlement agreement’s non-disparagement provision.31  In 
response to this penalization, Overbey filed another action arguing that the 
non-disparagement clause violated her First Amendment right to free 
speech.32  The City moved to dismiss the charges, or alternatively sought 
summary judgment.33  Despite not having completed any discovery, the 
United States District Court for the District of Maryland granted the City’s 
motion for summary judgment.34  The district court upheld the non-
disparagement clause, reasoning that Overbey entered into the settlement 
voluntarily and that the agreement was not contrary to public policy.35  On 
appeal, the Fourth Circuit reviewed the order to resolve whether the non-
disparagement clause violated Overbey’s First Amendment rights and was 
therefore void.36 
                                                          
 29.  Id. (“The Sun’s story accumulated several anonymous, race-inflected comments implying 
that Overbey had initiated a confrontation with the police in hopes of getting a payout from the 
City.”).  Examples of the language used by commenters include: “[Y]ou never touch a police 
officer . . . I would rather be shot by a Taser, then [sic] a bullet.  I can”t [sic] wait until you need 
their help in the future.  Enjoy the money!!” and “So, OK, I can call the cops, assault one of them, 
get tased and get paid!  Sounds like a plan!”  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 18, at 9–10. 
 30.  Overbey, 930 F.3d at 220.  Examples of Overbey’s comments responses include: 
I am the woman who this article is talking about AND THE POLICE WERE WRONG!!  
This article doesn’t come close to WHAT REALLY HAPPENED or tell how three men 
over 200 lbs each beat me (115 lbs) bruises all over my body a black eye AND tased 
twice all in front my 2 yr old daughter so before you decide to put ur [sic] 
MEANINGLESS opinion in on something FIND OUT THE FACTS FIRST!  IF I were 
wrong my charges wldntve [sic] ben [sic] thrown out and i wldntve [sic] received a dime.  
and  
AND THIS WAS ALL AFTER I CALLED THEM FOR HELP AFTER MY HOME 
HAD BEEN BURGULARIZED WHILE I WAS AT WORK!!  SO ANYONE WHO 
HAS ANYTHING TO SAY (NEGATIVITY) YOU CAN TAKE UR [sic] OPINION 
AND SHOVE IT!!   
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 18, 9–10. 
 31.  Overbey, 930 F.3d at 220.  The City claimed that the liquidated damages provision allowed 
the City to withhold half of Overbey’s settlement amount due to her violation of the non-
disparagement clause and the City’s supposed injury by Overbey’s conduct.  Id.  
 32.  Id. at 221.  The Baltimore Brew, a local news organization that investigates police 
misconduct, joined Overbey’s suit and argued that the non-disparagement clause similarly violated 
the news organization’s First Amendment “interest in newsgathering.”  Id.  
 33.  Id.   
 34.  Id.  
 35.  Id.  The district court also granted the City’s motion for summary judgment against the 
Brew by concluding that the Brew lacked standing.  Id.  
 36.  Id.  The Fourth Circuit also resolved whether the Brew had standing in order to bring a 
claim against the City and the Baltimore City Police Department.  Id. at 230.  
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The First Amendment guarantee of free speech reads simply, “Congress 
shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”37  Since the adoption 
of the Bill of Rights, the Court has sought to interpret how far that freedom 
of speech extends.38  The Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence reveals a 
strong commitment to uninhibited speech, especially when that speech is 
used by individuals to critique the government.39  In reviewing the relevant 
jurisprudence underlying the Fourth Circuit’s decision and its implications, 
Section II.A reviews the Court’s approach of content-specific speech 
restrictions, including speech that is critical of the government.40  Section 
II.B then examines the superiority of the First Amendment right over 
competing interests.41  Section II.C finally explores the Court’s discussion of 
the overlap between First Amendment freedom of speech and its relation to 
individual autonomy.42 
A. First Amendment and Content-Specific Speech Restrictions 
Since the 1960s, the Court has repeatedly struck down content-specific 
speech protections in favor of a jurisprudence that is protective of the 
freedom of speech.43  A unanimous Court in New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan44 announced the modern day First Amendment jurisprudence around 
content-specific speech restrictions.45  Content-specific speech restrictions 
refer to state-imposed restrictions that prohibit speech based on the subject 
that the speech addresses.46  The Court articulated a strong basis for the 
                                                          
 37.  U.S. CONST. amend. I.  The First Amendment right to freedom of speech was incorporated 
against the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Gitlow v. New 
York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (“[F]reedom of speech . . . [is] among the fundamental personal 
rights and ‘liberties’ protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from 
impairment of the States.”). 
 38.  See infra Sections II.A–C.  
 39.  See infra Sections II.A–C. 
 40.  See infra Section II.A.  
 41.  See infra Section II.B.  
 42.  See infra Section II.C.  
 43.  See infra notes 44–63 and accompanying text.  
 44.  376 U.S. 254 (1964).  
 45.  See id. at 270.  The Court’s approach to the First Amendment became increasingly 
protective of free speech following New York Times Co.  Compare id. (noting that the Court 
considered the case in light of a “profound national commitment” to public debate that may include 
“vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials”), 
with Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 623 (1919) (holding that the use of “disloyal and 
abusive language” about the government during war was properly silenced by government because 
the purpose was to “excite” and “embarrass[]” the military overseas).  
 46.  See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 380–82 (1992) (holding that an ordinance 
that prohibited cross burning specifically rooted in causing anger based on certain characteristics 
was invalid because “[c]ontent-based regulations are presumptively invalid”).   
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importance of First Amendment protections when balanced against 
government-critical speech.47  In New York Times Co., the Court evaluated 
the constitutionality of a state law on libel actions brought by public officials 
and established a required showing of “actual malice.”48  The libel action 
related to a newspaper advertisement that detailed efforts in the Civil Rights 
Movement and the police response to stifle the movement with “intimidation 
and violence.”49  The Court described the important interest underlying 
freedom of speech and the First Amendment, stating “we consider this case 
against the background of a profound national commitment to the principle 
that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, 
and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly 
sharp attacks on government and public officials.”50  The unanimous decision 
in New York Times Co. established that First Amendment speech rights are 
subject to significantly high protection in the interest of the “interchange of 
ideas.”51 
Soon after New York Times Co., the Court in Brandenburg v. Ohio52 
again emphasized the importance of protecting content-specific speech by 
setting out a narrow test for speech that is not protected.53  In Brandenburg, 
the Court stated that a constitutional right to free speech, “do[es] not permit 
a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force . . . except where 
such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action 
and is likely to incite or produce such action.”54  The Court showed the great 
deference given to freedom of speech and the sharp limits of states that try to 
curtail it.55  The Court’s reasoning in both New York Times Co. and 
                                                          
 47.  N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 270.  
 48.  Id. at 279–80 (“The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits 
a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct 
unless he proves that the statement was made with ‘actual malice’—that is, with knowledge that it 
was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.”). 
 49.  Id. at 257–58. 
 50.  Id. at 270.  The Court more recently expressed its continued opinion that government-
critical speech may not be prohibited by the government.  Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 256 
(2006) (“[T]he First Amendment prohibits government officials from subjecting an individual to 
retaliatory actions . . . for speaking out . . . .”).  
 51.  376 U.S. at 269 (“The constitutional safeguard, we have said, ‘was fashioned to assure 
unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the 
people.’” (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957))). 
 52.  395 U.S. 444 (1969).  
 53.  Id. at 447 (noting that the Court’s decisions stand for the principle that the government’s 
ability to interfere with free speech is limited to very special circumstances).  
 54.  Id.  Brandenburg concerned a Ku Klux Klan rally where the speakers stated that if the 
government did not address the “suppress[ion] of whites,” there would be a “possible . . . 
revengeance.”  Id. at 446.  The rally was subsequently played on television because the organizers 
invited a reporter to attend.  Id. at 446–47. 
 55.  Id. at 448.  
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Brandenburg reveals its disapproval for state challenges to free speech at the 
expense of open dialogue and debate.56 
Following this progression, the Court in Police Department of Chicago 
v. Mosley57 held that restricting peaceful picketing based on content violated 
the First Amendment, noting that “above all else, the First Amendment 
means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its 
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”58  Similarly, in Simon & 
Schuster, Inc. v. Members of New York State Crime Victims Board,59 the 
Court explored whether governments can impose financial burdens on 
individuals based on the content of their speech.60  The Court reasoned, “the 
government’s ability to impose content-based burdens on speech raises the 
specter that the government may effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints 
from the marketplace.”61  Applying strict scrutiny, the Court found that the 
state did have a compelling interest but that its means of achieving that 
compelling interest were not narrowly tailored.62  The Court affirmed 
limiting content-specific speech was “beyond the power of the government” 
because the Constitution envisions a “political system” that rests upon 
“individual dignity and choice” in “the arena of public discussion.”63  
More recent precedent also expanded on interests at issue in content-
specific speech restrictions.64  In Citizens United v. Federal Election 
Commission,65 the Court stated that the First Amendment is premised on a 
“mistrust of governmental power” and the dangers of content control.66  In 
its reasoning, the Court noted that regulating content leads to unacceptable 
results, stating: 
By taking the right to speak from some and giving it to others, the 
Government deprives the disadvantaged person or class of the right 
to use speech to strive to establish worth, standing, and respect for 
                                                          
 56.  See supra notes 44–55 and accompanying text.   
 57.  408 U.S. 92 (1972).   
 58.  Id. at 95, 97–98.  The ordinance at issue limited peaceful picketing unrelated to picketing 
schools involved in labor disputes.  Id. at 93.  
 59.  502 U.S. 105 (1991). 
 60.  Id.  
 61.  Id. at 116 (citing Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 448–49 (1991)).  
 62.  Id. at 120–21, 123.  The New York law at issue was a Son of Sam law concerning publishing 
books based on criminal acts that required “any entity contracting with an accused or convicted 
person for a depiction of the crime to submit a copy of the contract to respondent New York State 
Crime Victims Board . . . and to turn over any income under that contract to the Board.”  Id. at 109.  
 63.  Id. at 116 (citing Leathers, 499 U.S. at 448–49).  
 64.  See infra note 65 and accompanying text. 
 65.  558 U.S. 310 (2010). The Court addressed the constitutionality of a statute that prohibited 
corporations from using funds to advocate for particularly political candidates.  Id.  The Court found 
that the statute suppressed political speech and an “essential mechanism of democracy.”  Id. at 339.  
 66.  Id. at 340. 
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the speaker’s voice.  The Government may not by these means 
deprive the public of the right and privilege to determine for itself 
what speech and speakers are worthy of consideration.67 
The Court affirmed that content restrictions that suppress political speech are 
contrary to the functioning of a democracy.68 
B. First Amendment Superiority over Challenges 
In addition to guarding against content-specific speech restrictions, the 
Court also continues to find that the interests underlying freedom of speech 
are superior to almost all other competing interests.69  All content-specific 
speech restrictions are subject to a strict scrutiny analysis.70  Any content-
based restriction on speech by the state must “further[] a compelling [state] 
interest” and be “narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.”71  Content-
specific speech restrictions are presumptively unconstitutional unless the 
state meets this high burden, even when an individual choses to waive their 
First Amendment right.72 
In light of this analysis, over time, the Court has prioritized the interests 
underlying First Amendment rights over competing interests.73  In 1919, the 
Supreme Court decided Abrams v. United States74  and concluded that the 
Espionage Act of 1917 was constitutional.75  However, since its Abrams 
decision, the Court has repeatedly found that, when the freedom of speech 
has been curtailed by a government entity, the interest in protecting the First 
Amendment far outweighed any competing interest.76  For instance, as 
explained in the previous Section, the Court in New York Times Co. protected 
                                                          
 67.  Id. at 340–41.  
 68.  Id. at 339.  
 69.  See infra notes 70–101 and accompanying text.  
 70.  See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2231 (2015) (noting that “[b]ecause the 
Town’s Sign Code imposes content-based restrictions on speech, those provisions can stand only if 
they survive strict scrutiny”).  
 71.  Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 340 (citation omitted).  
 72.  Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2226. 
 73.  See infra notes 76–94 and accompanying text.  
 74.  250 U.S. 616 (1919).  
 75.  Id. at 616–17.  The Espionage Act sought to limit government critique during World War 
I.  Id.  The charges brought against the petitioners were for “disloyal, scurrilous and abusive 
language about the . . . Government of the United States,” “language ‘intended to bring the form of 
Government of the United States into contempt, scorn, contumely, and disrepute,’” “language 
‘intended to incite, provoke and encourage resistance to the United States in said war,’” and “that 
the defendants conspired ‘when the United States was at war . . . unlawfully and willfully, by 
utterance, writing, printing and publication, to urge, incite and advocate curtailment of production 
of things and products . . . necessary and essential to the prosecution of the war.”  Id. (quoting 
Espionage Act of Congress (§ 3, Title I, of Act approved June 15, 1917, as amended May 16, 1918, 
40 Stat. 553)).  
 76.  See infra notes 77–94 and accompanying text.  
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free speech over the state’s interest in preventing attacks on government 
officials and damage to professional reputation.77  Although not at issue in 
New York Times Co., the Court also examined the history of the Sedition Act 
of 1798 that penalized “malicious” speech about the government and noted 
that “[a]lthough the Sedition Act was never tested in this Court, the attack 
upon its validity has carried the day in the court of history.”78  The Court 
emphasized that the Sedition Act of 1798 surpassed the allowances under the 
First Amendment in its restriction on speech.79  This sentiment is echoed in 
other sources throughout both the country’s and the Court’s history.80 
In Wooley v. Maynard,81 the Court affirmed an individual’s right not to 
speak or express the state’s motto on a license plate at the compulsion of the 
government.82  The Court again found the interests underlying the First 
Amendment more compelling than the state’s purported interests in the 
restriction.83  Particularly, the Court noted, “where the State’s interest is to 
disseminate an ideology, no matter how acceptable to some, such interest 
cannot outweigh an individual’s First Amendment right to avoid becoming 
the courier for such message.”84  The Court rejected the State’s asserted 
interest in efficiency and compliance as insufficient to “stifle fundamental 
personal liberties.”85 
                                                          
 77.  N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273 (1964) (“Criticism of their official conduct 
does not lose its constitutional protection merely because it is effective criticism and hence 
diminishes their official reputations.”). 
 78.  Id. at 273–74, 276 (“That statute made it a crime, punishable by a $5,000 fine and five 
years in prison, ‘if any person shall write, print, utter or publish . . . any false, scandalous and 
malicious writing or writings against the government of the United States . . . with intent to 
defame . . . or to bring them . . . into contempt or disrepute.”).  The Court provided examples 
supporting the conclusion that the Sedition Act was not valid, despite never being challenged in the 
Court, nothing that those convicted under the act were pardoned, fines were repaid by Congress 
because they were unconstitutional, a senate report noted the invalidity of the Act, and repeatedly 
assumed invalid by the Court.  Id. at 276  
 79.  Id.  
 80.  See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630–31 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (noting that 
the constitutionality of the Sedition Act of 1798 has since been rejected, indicated by repaying 
fines); see also 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, VIRGINIA RESOLUTIONS OF 1798, 553–554 (2d ed., 1836) 
(“[T]he General Assembly doth particularly PROTEST against the palpable and alarming 
infractions of the Constitution, in the two late cases of the ‘Alien and Sedition Acts,’ . . . and . . . 
[the other provision] exercises . . . a power not delegated by the constitution, but on the contrary, 
expressly and positively forbidden by one of the amendments thereto; a power, which more than 
any other ought to produce universal alarm, because it is levelled against the right of freely 
examining public characters and measures, and of free communication among people thereon, 
which has ever been justly deemed the only effectual guardian of every other right.”). 
 81.  430 U.S. 705 (1977).  
 82.  Id. at 717 (“We conclude that the State . . . may not require appellees to display the state 
motto upon their license plates . . . .” (footnote omitted)).   
 83.  Id. at 717. 
 84.  Id. (footnote omitted). 
 85.  Id. at 716.  
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More recently, the Court in Houston v. Hill86 opined on the 
constitutionality of an ordinance that criminalized the act of interrupting a 
police officer performing their duties.87  In concluding that the ordinance was 
overly broad, the Court stated that “the First Amendment protects a 
significant amount of verbal criticism and challenge directed at police 
officers.”88  The Court affirmed the importance of provocative and 
challenging speech, so long as it does not evoke a clear and present danger.89  
The Court’s protection of First Amendment interests has withstood 
many challenged interests, expressing superiority over verbal attacks of 
government officials,90 criticism of government during war time under the 
auspices of national security,91 both practical ease of regulation and 
promoting a state ideology,92 and verbal interference with police.93  The 
Court’s only meaningful restriction on free speech is on speech that 
advocates for the use of force only when that advocacy is both directed at and 
likely to cause that force to occur.94 
The Fourth Circuit has also opined on balancing First Amendment 
interests when individuals choose to waive their First Amendment rights.95  
Waivers of constitutional rights are not always enforceable, and, as with the 
cases discussed above, the analysis requires balancing interests.96  The Fourth 
Circuit adopts common law contract principles to determine whether waivers 
of constitutional rights are enforceable, but the analysis requires a higher 
level of scrutiny “because the law does not presume the waiver of 
                                                          
 86.  482 U.S. 451 (1987).  
 87.  Id. at 453.  The specific speech act at issue was an individual shouting at a police officer 
making an arrest.  Id. at 453–54. 
 88.  Id. at 461.  
 89.  Id. (quoting Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949)); see Lewis v. City of New 
Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 133–134 (1974) (“[T]he transcendent value to all society of constitutionally 
protected expression is deemed to justify allowing ‘attacks on overly broad statutes with no 
requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be 
regulated by a statute drawn with the requisite narrow specificity’ . . . This is deemed necessary 
because persons whose expression is constitutionally protected may well refrain from exercising 
their rights for fear of criminal sanctions provided by a statute susceptible of application to protected 
expression.” (quoting Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 520–21 (1972)).  
 90.  See supra note 77 and accompanying text.  
 91.  See supra notes 78–80 and accompanying text.  
 92.  See supra notes 81–85 and accompanying text.  
 93.  See supra notes 86–89 and accompanying text. 
 94.  See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).  The Court does not prohibit speech 
that advocates the use of force, but merely the type of force that meets the requirements put forth in 
the statute.  Id. at 448.  Otherwise the restriction would condemn speech “which our Constitution 
has immunized from governmental control.”  Id.  
 95.  See infra notes 96–100 and accompanying text.  
 96.  Lake James Cmty. Volunteer Fire Dep’t, Inc. v. Burke Cty., 149 F.3d 277, 280 (4th Cir. 
1998). 
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constitutional rights.”97  Relying on Supreme Court precedent, the Fourth 
Circuit reasoned that in order to enforce waivers of constitutional rights, a 
waiver must be knowing, voluntary, and “not undermine the relevant public 
interest.”98  The Fourth Circuit in Pee Dee Health Care, P.A. v. Sanford99 
held that a constitutional waiver clause is unenforceable “if the interest in its 
enforcement is outweighed in the circumstances by a public policy harmed 
by enforcement of the agreement.”100 
The protection of the First Amendment has withstood challenges from 
many competing interests, and even when an individual chooses to waive 
their constitutional right, the enforcement is still subject to a heightened 
analysis to determine if the interest is sufficient to justify overcoming a 
constitutional right.101 
C. First Amendment and Individual Autonomy 
The Supreme Court’s discussions about policies underlying the First 
Amendment are restricted to specific cases or controversies.102  It has at times 
elaborated on how freedom of speech is linked to individual autonomy and 
the separation of individual speech from the government.103  While the Court 
in Abrams v. United States upheld the Espionage Act’s prohibition on 
government-critical speech, it is Justice Holmes’ dissent that laid a crucial 
foundation for the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence.104  In his dissent, 
Justice Holmes identified the marketplace of ideas concept, stating: 
But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting 
faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe the 
very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good 
desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test 
of truth is the power of thought to get itself accepted in the 
competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon 
which their wishes safely can be carried out.  That at any rate is the 
theory of our Constitution.105  
                                                          
 97.  Id.; see Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Com., 301 U.S. 292, 307 (1937) (“We do not 
presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights.”).  
 98.  Lake James Cmty. Volunteer Fire Dep’t, 149 F.3d at 280.  
 99.  Pee Dee Health Care, P.A. v. Sanford, 509 F.3d 204 (4th Cir. 2007). 
 100.  Pee Dee Health Care, P.A., 509 F.3d at 212 (quoting Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 
392 (1987)).  
 101.  See supra notes 69–100 and accompanying text. 
 102.  See Doremus v. Bd. of Ed., 342 U.S. 429, 434 (1952) (“But, because our own jurisdiction 
is cast in terms of ‘case or controversy,’ we cannot accept as the basis for review, nor as the basis 
for conclusive disposition of an issue of federal law without review, any procedure which does not 
constitute such.”).  
 103.  See infra notes 107–114 and accompanying text.  
 104.  See infra notes 105–106 and accompanying text.  
 105.  Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).  
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Holmes’ marketplace of ideas continues to provide an important 
consideration in more recent First Amendment decisions.106  
In 1949, the Court in Terminiello v. Chicago107 addressed the 
importance of protecting freedom of speech and stated that “[t]he vitality of 
civil and political institutions in our society depends on free discussion” and 
that our freedom of speech separates us from “totalitarian regimes.”108  
Censoring speech absent a clear and present danger would “lead to the 
standardization of ideas either by the legislatures, courts, or dominant 
political or community groups.”109  
The Court similarly discussed the importance of the First Amendment 
for individual autonomy in Virginia v. Hicks.110  In Hicks, the Court analyzed 
the enforceability of a no-trespassing policy.111  In its opinion, the Court 
noted a concern for the burden that individuals may face in attempts to assert 
their freedom of speech when challenged by the government.112  The burden 
to challenge speech restrictions not only harms the person whose rights have 
been violated, but also “society as a whole, which is deprived of an 
uninhibited marketplace of ideas.”113  The Court’s opinion emphasized the 
risk posed by state restrictions on the First Amendment—that restrictions 
disproportionately affect individuals who are unable to take on the 
“considerable burden (and . . . risk)” to challenge the infringement.114  These 
examples illustrate the Court’s concern about the marketplace of ideas, 
individual autonomy, and how the First Amendment protects against 
silencing voices at the behest of the government.115  
                                                          
 106.  See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010) (discussing 
the “integrity of the marketplace of political ideas”); Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119 (2003) 
(discussing society’s need for an “uninhibited marketplace of ideas”); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 
376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) (discussing the necessity of “unfettered interchange of ideas”).  
 107.  337 U.S. 1 (1949).  
 108.  Id. at 4.  The Court noted that the First Amendment should only be restricted when balanced 
against a clear and present danger that extends beyond dispute, unrest, or inconvenience.  Id. 
(citation omitted).  Terminiello concerned a man leading a meeting charged with breach of the peace 
because he harshly criticized outside protesters, leading to disturbances that police could not control.  
Id. at 3.  
 109.  Id. at 4–5.  
 110.  539 U.S. 113 (2003).  
 111.  Id. at 115–16.  The trespassing policy a particular housing development for low-income 
residents that implemented an ordinance that closed the streets to public to address “rampant crime 
and drug dealing” and allowed police to “serve notice” to any person in violation who could not 
demonstrate a “legitimate business or social purpose.”  Id. (emphasis excluded).  Hicks, having been 
convicted of trespass, challenged the ordinance as “unconstitutionally overbroad and void for 
vagueness.”  Id. at 117.   
 112.  Id. at 119.  
 113.  Id.  
 114.  Id.  
 115.  See supra notes 103–114 and accompanying text.  
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III. THE COURT’S REASONING 
With Judge Floyd writing for the 2-1 majority, the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the inclusion of a non-
disparagement clause in a settlement agreement with a victim of police 
brutality constituted a waiver of the victim’s First Amendment rights.116  This 
case arose on appeal of the district court’s grant of summary judgment for 
the City.117  The court reasoned that the public interest in protecting 
Overbey’s First Amendment rights outweighed the City’s countervailing 
interests.118  Therefore, the agreement to waive her First Amendment rights 
was void.119 
The court first concluded that the settlement agreement, including a non-
disparagement provision restricting Overbey’s communications with the 
public, constituted a waiver of her First Amendment rights.120  The court 
rejected the City’s argument that the non-disparagement provision was 
enforceable because Overbey was merely exercising her right not to speak 
when she agreed to the settlement.121  The court explained that the right not 
to speak originated to prevent compulsion of individual speech by the 
government.122  In Overbey’s case, the non-disparagement clause “curb[ed] 
her voluntary speech to meet the City’s specifications” which constituted a 
waiver of her protections under the First Amendment.123  The court 
emphasized that there are compelling public interests contrary to the 
agreement and rejected the City’s argument that this was an exercise of 
Overbey’s right not to speak.124 
Having established that the non-disparagement clause waived 
Overbey’s First Amendment rights, the court then evaluated the policy 
interests in favor and opposed to enforceability of the settlement provision.125  
First, the court identified two strong public policy interests at the core of the 
First Amendment that show the provision is contrary to public interest: (1) 
                                                          
 116.  Overbey v. Mayor of Baltimore, 930 F.3d 215, 222 (4th Cir. 2019). 
 117.  Id. at 219. 
 118.  Id. at 226.  
 119.  Id. at 222.  
 120.  Id.  
 121.  Id. at 222–23. 
 122.  Id. at 223. 
 123.  Id.  
 124.  Id.  
 125.  Id.  In assessing the enforceability of a waiver of Overbey’s First Amendment rights, the 
Court looked to (1) whether she entered with contract knowingly and voluntarily and (2) whether 
there were competing interests in favor of enforcing the waiver of her First Amendment rights that 
were not overpowered by a “relevant public policy that would be harmed by enforcement” of the 
waiver.  Id.  The court addressed only the second factor in this assessment because it was “decisive 
as a matter of law.”  Id.  
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commitment to open debate on public issues and (2) individual speech about 
mistrust of governmental power.126  In assessing both of these interests, the 
government’s use of the non-disparagement provision to curb Overbey’s 
speech “was contrary to the citizenry’s First Amendment interest in limiting 
the government’s ability to target and remove speech critical of the 
government from public disclosure.”127  
The court then evaluated each interest asserted by the City in favor of 
enforcing the waiver.128  The City claimed a public interest in efficiency—to 
settle cases quickly and not spend money on litigation.129  The court reasoned 
that efficiency is not a sufficiently compelling interest to overcome the 
waiver of a constitutional right.130  The City asserted further that the officers 
had an interest in clearing their names of Overbey’s accusations and that the 
City had an interest in avoiding harmful publicity.131  The court rejected each 
of these arguments by noting that protecting public officials from criticism is 
not sufficiently compelling to override First Amendment rights, and further, 
the non-disparagement clause does not serve the interest of allowing the 
officers to clear their names.132  Finally, the City argued that even if the court 
found that the settlement constituted a waiver of her rights, the provision was 
still enforceable because Overbey had the option to “buy [her rights] back” 
by forfeiting half of the settlement.133  The court rejected this argument, 
stating that “[w]e have never ratified the government’s purchase of a 
potential critic’s silence merely because it would be unfair to deprive the 
government of the full value of its hush money.”134  The court concluded by 
finding that the City’s interests were not sufficient to justify enforcing a 
                                                          
 126.  Id. at 224. 
 127.  Id. at 224–25. 
 128.  Id. at 225–26. 
 129.  Id. at 225.  
 130.  Id.  The court similarly responded to an argument by the City that Overbey merely 
exercised her right not to speak in accepting the settlement terms.  Id.  The court again emphasized 
that the right not to speak was intended to protect individual voices from compulsion of speech by 
governments.  Id.  
 131.  Id. at 225–26. 
 132.  Id. at 226 (“Enforcing a waiver of First Amendment rights for the very purpose of 
insulating public officials from unpleasant attacks would plainly undermine that core First 
Amendment principle.”).  
 133.  Id. (citing Brief for Appellees at 39, Overbey v. Mayor of Baltimore, 930 F.3d 215 (4th 
Cir. 2019) (No. 17-2444)).  
 134.  Id. (“We are not eager to get into that business now.”).  
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provision that waived Overbey’s First Amendment rights.135  As such, the 
court reversed and remanded the matter to the district court.136 
In his dissent, Judge Quattlebaum diverged from the majority’s 
reasoning in favor of the City.137  Judge Quattlebaum reasoned that, based on 
the limited impairment of the public policy interests and the City’s 
compelling interests, the non-disparagement provision should be upheld.138  
In assessing the impact of the non-disparagement clause, Judge Quattlebaum 
relied predominantly on four factors: (1) the narrow impact of the restriction 
on Overbey’s First Amendment rights, (2) Overbey’s ability to speak freely 
should she forgo half of her settlement, (3) the public’s existing awareness of 
the police misconduct and settlement, and (4) Overbey’s right not to speak.139 
Judge Quattlebaum then assessed the City’s interest in enforcing the 
agreement and found them compelling.140  Judge Quattlebaum stressed that 
the finality and certainty of contracts are strong and compelling interests, 
especially considering the City forwent an “opportunity for vindication by a 
judge or jury” in favor of settlement.141  Judge Quattlebaum concluded that 
the majority erred in its balancing of the relevant policies and stated that the 
district court’s dismissal ought to have been affirmed.142 
IV. ANALYSIS 
In Overbey v. Mayor of Baltimore, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Fourth Circuit held that Baltimore City’s use of non-disparagement 
clauses in their settlements with victims of police brutality violated the 
victims’ First Amendment right to free speech.143  This Part argues first that 
the case was correctly decided because the court’s reasoning was consistent 
with the protective First Amendment jurisprudence.144  This Part next argues 
that the court’s holding affirms the importance of protecting speech that is 
critical of the government.145  The importance of protecting speech is further 
                                                          
 135.  Id.  The court continued with an analysis of standing for the Baltimore Brew based on 
“whether the Brew’s plausible allegations in the Amended Complaint, taken as true, are enough to 
give the Brew constitutional standing.”  Id. at 227. The court ultimately concluded that the Brew 
plead sufficiently to meet the standing requirement.  Id. at 230.  
 136.  Id. at 230.  
 137.  Id. (Quattlebaum, J., dissenting).  
 138.  Id.  Judge Quattlebaum began his dissent by noting that the freedom to contract is a 
“bedrock principle[] of our country.”  Id.  
 139.  Id. at 232–33. 
 140.  Id. at 233. 
 141.  Id. 
 142.  Id. at 234. 
 143.  Id. at 226 (majority opinion). 
 144.  See infra Section IV.A.   
 145.  See infra Section IV.B. 
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supported by the various goals underlying the First Amendment—the goals 
of truth, self-governance, and self-fulfillment.146  Finally, this Part argues that 
the court’s holding supports an important implication in application of 
government-critical speech protections to victims of police brutality, most 
often individuals in marginalized communities.147  Therefore, the court’s 
correct decision plays an important role in affirming the First Amendment 
jurisprudence and its application to government efforts to silence specific 
individuals, most often people of color, from sharing their experiences in 
public discourse.148 
A. The Court Correctly Decided Overbey v. Mayor of Baltimore in 
Light of First Amendment Jurisprudence 
In assessing whether the waiver of Overbey’s right to free speech was 
enforceable, the court correctly balanced the interest in affirming Overbey’s 
First Amendment right with the City’s asserted interest in enforcing the non-
disparagement clause of the agreement.149  This assessment addressed the 
argument that Overbey voluntarily chose to waive her right to free speech 
and therefore the court should not intervene.150  Relying on Pee Dee Health 
Care v. Sanford, the court showed that a waiver of Overbey’s free speech 
right was only enforceable if the interest was not outweighed by a 
countervailing public policy.151  In analyzing the public policy interests, the 
court correctly identified open debate and mistrust of the government as 
important public policy interests underlying the importance of Overbey’s 
First Amendment right to free speech.152  The court relied on New York Times 
Co. v. Sullivan in finding that there was a “profound” commitment to open 
debate on public issues and Citizens United v. Federal Elections Commission 
to identify a strong interest in mistrust of government power.153  Police 
                                                          
 146.  See infra Section IV.B. 
 147.  See infra Section IV.C.  
 148.  See infra Section IV.A–C.  
 149.  Overbey v. Mayor of Baltimore, 930 F.3d 215, 226 (4th Cir. 2019). 
 150.  Id. at 225.  But see id. at 230 (Quattlebaum, J., dissenting) (“One of the bedrock principles 
of our country is the freedom of parties, public and private, to enter into agreements without fear 
that courts will re-write them if one side has a change of heart.”).  
 151.  Id. at 223; see also Pee Dee Health Care, P.A. v. Sanford, 509 F.3d 204, 212 (4th Cir. 
2007).  
 152.  Overbey, 930 F.3d at 224; see supra Section II.A–B. 
 153.  Overbey, 930 F.3d at 223; see N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270–71 (1964) 
(“Thus we consider this case against the background of a profound national commitment to the 
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may 
well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public 
officials.  The present advertisement, as an expression of grievance and protest on one of the major 
public issues of our time, would seem clearly to qualify for the constitutional protection.” (citations 
omitted)); see also Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010).  The court 
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brutality, at issue in Overbey, is a public policy issue that should be subject 
to open debate, as discussed in New York Times Co.154  The current social 
consciousness around police use of force, particularly against Black 
individuals in Baltimore City, leaves little doubt that experiences of police 
brutality raise important public issues, and the government seeks to minimize 
critiques by compelling silence from victims of police brutality.155  
In its defense, the City asserted three interests—efficiency, the 
opportunity for officers to clear their names, and curtailment of harmful 
publicity.156  According to the both the Supreme Court and the Fourth Circuit, 
none of these concerns are sufficiently compelling to overcome Overbey’s 
individual interest in free speech or society’s interest in the free exchange of 
ideas.157  The Court in Wooley v. Maynard explicitly rejected that state 
administration and efficiency is a compelling public policy.158  Further, New 
York Times Co. and the Court’s critique of the Sedition Act shows that attacks 
on government officials and the concern of government attacks raising 
national security issues are not sufficient to curtail speech.159  If national 
security and public condemnation of public officials based on false 
information are not sufficiently compelling to impose a restriction on 
government-critical speech, then concern about harmful publicity is hardly 
enough.160 
The Court has described the outer limits of the First Amendment and 
the greatest restriction, per Brandenburg v. Ohio, is action that is directed 
toward effectuating imminent lawless action.161  Absent such a compelling 
policy, the state may not restrict a person’s right to free speech, especially 
                                                          
also affirmed the importance of protecting speech regardless of content, as seen in Simon & 
Schuster, Inc. v. Members of New York State Crime Victims Board and Police Department of 
Chicago v. Mosley.  Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 
105 (1991); Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972). 
 154.   See N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 270.  
 155.  See CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE BALTIMORE CITY 
POLICE DEPARTMENT 1, 3 (2016), https://www.justice.gov/crt/file/883296/download.  The U.S. 
Department of Justice investigated the Baltimore City Police Department and found a pattern of 
“(1) making unconstitutional stops, searches, and arrests; (2) using enforcement strategies that 
produce severe and unjustified disparities in the rates of stops, searches and arrests of African 
Americans; (3) using excessive force; and (4) retaliating against people engaged in constitutionally-
protected expression.”  Id.  
 156.  Overbey v. Mayor of Baltimore, 930 F.3d 215, 225–26. (4th Cir. 2019). 
 157.  Id.; see supra Section II.B. 
 158.  430 U.S. 705, 716 (1977). 
 159.  N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 274–76 (1964).  In New York Times Co., the 
information shared criticizing the government official was found to be factually false, and it was 
still not sufficient to restrict the speech.  Id. at 258. 
 160.  See id. at 273–76. 
 161.  395 U.S. 444, 447–48 (1969). 
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when that person is speaking critically about the government.162  Therefore, 
because of the important interests underlying Overbey’s First Amendment 
rights and the lack of compelling state interests, the restriction of Overbey’s 
speech was an unconstitutional restriction of her First Amendment free 
speech right.163 
B. The Court’s Holding Affirmed the Importance of Government-
Critical Speech Protections Consistent with Policies Underlying the 
First Amendment 
The importance of protecting speech that criticizes the government is 
one of the foundations of democracy—without it, the government would be 
a “totalitarian regime.”164  The Supreme Court in New York Times Co., 
Citizens United, and Houston v. Hill emphasized the importance of protecting 
government critique and verbal attacks of government officials.165  In 
Houston, the Court restricted the ability of the state to punish a party for 
verbally interfering with police.166  The Court reasoned that “[t]he freedom 
of individuals verbally to oppose or challenge police action . . . is one of the 
principal characteristics by which we distinguish a free nation from a police 
state.”167  The Court’s jurisprudence illustrates that the government cannot 
dictate belief and speech, nor are the government’s interest entitled to greater 
weight than individual speech.168 
The importance of protecting government-critical speech is also 
emphasized by multiple foundational theories of the First Amendment.169  
                                                          
 162.  Id.  
 163.  See supra notes 149–162 and accompanying text.  
 164.  Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) (“Speech is often provocative and 
challenging.  It may strike at prejudices and preconceptions and have profound unsettling effects as 
it presses for acceptance of an idea.  That is why freedom of speech, though not absolute . . . is 
nevertheless protected against censorship or punishment . . . .” (citation omitted)).   
 165.  See Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 461 (1987) (addressing the state’s inability to limit 
critical speech in an engagement with police); supra notes 152–160 and accompanying text. 
 166.  Houston, 482 U.S. at 461. 
 167.  Id. at 462–63.  
 168.  See supra 164–167 and accompanying text; see also Overbey v. Mayor of Baltimore, 930 
F.3d 215, 225–26. (4th Cir. 2019). 
 169.  See Alexander Tsesis, Free Speech Constitutionalism, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1015, 1016–
17 (2015) (“Three competing free speech theories dominate U.S. judicial and scholarly discourse.  
Proponents of the first theory claim that the purpose of protecting free speech is to further 
democratic institutions.  Those of the second school conceive the constitutional commitment to 
personal autonomy to be the reason why courts and society at large diligently safeguard and 
treasure free speech.  And those of the third persuasion connect the high regard for free speech to 
the advancement of knowledge.  All three of these approaches recognize that careful judicial 
scrutiny of speech regulations is essential to prevent government intrusions into private and political 
lives . . . . The Supreme Court has been inconsistent in its application, and, indeed, has never 
definitively adopted one over the others.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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While the Court has never explicitly adopted a single theory underlying the 
First Amendment, it has utilized a number of different theories at the core of 
the First Amendment in its reasoning.170  Three theoretical foundations 
underlying the First Amendment are (1) the search for truth, (2) the goal of 
self-governance, and (3) the goal of self-fulfillment and personal 
autonomy.171  
First, the theory that free speech is essential in the search for truth is 
often referred to as the “marketplace of ideas.”172  The marketplace of ideas 
theory is rooted in the ideology of John Stuart Mill.173  In Mill’s text, On 
Liberty, he noted: 
[T]he peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, that 
it is robbing the human race; posterity as well as the existing 
generation; those who dissent from the opinion, still more than 
those who hold it.  If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the 
opportunity of exchanging error for truth: if wrong, they lose, what 
is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier 
impression of truth, produced by its collision with error.174 
Mill’s theory states that truth will be discovered when society has access to 
all opinions on the matter.175  Mill’s theory also addresses concerns about 
when those opinions are silenced, noting that authorities that deny the truth 
of statements are not infallible and do not have the authority to decide truth 
for the whole community.176  Silencing opinions is an act of power, according 
to Mill and the marketplace of ideas.177 
                                                          
 170.  Id.  
 171.  GEOFFREY R. STONE, ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1014–15, 1017 (8th ed. 2018); see 
also Tsesis, supra note 169, at 1017 (“My claim is that First Amendment doctrine should reflect a 
general theory of constitutional law that protects individual liberty and the common good to open 
society.”). 
 172.  STONE ET AL., supra note 171, at 1014.  
 173.  Id.  
 174.  JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 14 (Kathy Casey ed., Dover Thrift Edition 2002) (1859). 
 175.  Id.  
 176.  Id. at 14–15 (“[T]he opinion which it is attempted to suppress by authority may possibly 
be true.  Those who desire to suppress it, of course deny its truth; but they are not infallible.  They 
have no authority to decide the question for all mankind, and exclude every other person from the 
means of judging.  To refuse a hearing to an opinion, because they are sure that it is false, is to 
assume that their certainty is the same thing as absolute certainty.  All silencing of discussion is an 
assumption of infallibility.”). 
 177.  Id.  The marketplace of ideas as a search for truth was introduced to the Court’s 
jurisprudence through Justice Holmes’ dissent in Abrams v. United States, with Holmes stating that 
the “best test of truth is the power of thought to get . . . accepted in the competition of the market.”  
250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).  The importance of free speech as it relates to 
ideas and the function of democracy was again echoed by the Court in Terminiello v. Chicago and 
its prohibition against silence “provocative” or “challenging” speech.  337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) (“The 
right to speak freely and to promote diversity of ideas and programs is therefore one of the chief 
distinctions that sets us apart from totalitarian regimes.”); see also Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 
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The court’s decision in Overbey is consistent with the search for truth.178  
The City’s practice of requiring non-disparagement provisions in their 
settlement agreements applies regularly to Baltimore City Police brutality 
settlements.179  Under a theory of the marketplace of ideas, the City’s 
restriction of Overbey’s speech (and the speech of others like her) prohibited 
her from offering a different opinion in a community conversation.180  With 
her speech, Overbey offered her experience to promote truth.181  To 
“attempt[] to suppress” her speech is to “deprive[] . . . the opportunity of 
exchanging error for truth.”182  In upholding Overbey’s First Amendment 
speech right, the court supported the search for truth by allowing Overbey to 
share her experience in the marketplace of ideas.183 
Second, the court’s decision is also consistent with underlying theory of 
the First Amendment that free speech is crucial to self-governance.184  
Alexander Meiklejohn promoted this idea in his book Free Speech and Its 
Relation to Self-Government.185  He stated, “[Citizens] may not be barred 
[from speaking] because their views are thought to be false or dangerous . . . 
when men govern themselves, it is they—and no one else—who must pass 
judgment on the unwisdom and unfairness and danger.”186  Speech cannot be 
restricted because it is crucial to the function of a democracy.187  This 
                                                          
554 U.S. 724, 755–56 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[I]t is the 
purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will 
ultimately prevail . . . .” (quoting Red Lion Broadcasting Co, v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969))). 
 178.  See infra notes 179–183 and accompanying text.  
 179.  Overbey v. Mayor of Baltimore, 930 F.3d 215, 220 (4th Cir. 2019). 
 180.  See id.; Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 4 (“The vitality of civil and political institutions in our 
society depends on free discussion . . . [I]t is only through free debate and free exchange of ideas 
that government remains responsive to the will of the people and peaceful change is effected.” 
(citation omitted)).  Overbey responded to internet commenters that accused her of lying to coerce 
a settlement from the Baltimore City Police Department.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 18, at 9.  
The sentiment that she was to blame for the police officers’ use of violence resulted in part from the 
City Solicitor describing her as “hostile” and noting that she had to be “Tased in order to calm 
down” when discussing her settlement.  Broadwater, supra note 26; see also Overbey, 930 F.3d at 
220.   
 181.   See MILL, supra note 174, at 14 (“If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the 
opportunity of exchanging error for truth: if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a benefit, the 
clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error.”). 
 182.  Id. 
 183.  See supra notes 172–182 and accompanying text.  
 184.  STONE ET AL., supra note 171, at 1015.  
 185.  Id. at 1016 (quoting ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO 
SELF-GOVERNMENT 15–16, 24–27, 39 (1948)). 
 186.  Id.  
 187.  Id.; see Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 
245, 255 (1961) (“We, the people who govern, must try to understand the issues which, incident by 
incident, face the nation.  We must pass judgment upon the decisions which our agents make upon 
those issues.  And, further, we must share in devising methods by which those decisions can be 
made wise and effective or, if need be, supplanted by others which promise greater wisdom and 
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philosophy was presented in Terminiello v. Chicago, which warned of a 
totalitarian regime should the court allow speech to be silenced.188  The State 
should not be allowed to dictate ideology by silencing voices.189 
The Fourth Circuit’s decision to not allow the waiver of Overbey’s free 
speech rights promotes the goal of self-governance in a functioning 
democracy.190  Specifically, the court’s protection of criticism of a 
government actor is crucial.191  Through the use of the non-disparagement 
clause, the City prohibited an experience from being shared with the 
public.192  Overbey’s experience was one of government agents beating her 
for no reason (other than arguably her race and gender)193 and represents a 
major political issue both nationally and within Baltimore City in 
particular.194  To deny that content from reaching the public, by silencing an 
individual’s voice, is contrary to the goal of self-governance.195  It bars 
Overbey, or anyone who experiences police brutality, from bringing truth to 
the public on a major social and political issue.196 
Third, the court’s decision strongly upholds the theory that the First 
Amendment is necessary for self-fulfillment and personal autonomy.197  
Personal autonomy refers to an individual’s capacity to “pursue successfully 
the life she endorses.”198  One scholar noted that autonomy requires that a 
person has the right to make decisions about themselves through self-
                                                          
effectiveness.  Now it is these activities, in all their diversity, whose freedom fills up ‘the scope of 
the First Amendment.’  These are the activities to whose freedom it gives its unqualified protection. 
And it must be recognized that the literal text of the Amendment falls far short of expressing the 
intent and the scope of that protection.”). 
 188.  Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949). 
 189.  Id.  
 190.  See Meiklejohn, supra note 187, at 255 (“The First Amendment does not protect a ‘freedom 
to speak.’  It protects the freedom of those activities of thought and communication by which we 
‘govern.’  It is concerned, not with a private right, but with a public power, a governmental 
responsibility.”). 
 191.  Overbey v. Mayor of Baltimore, 930 F.3d 215, 226 (4th Cir. 2019) (“Enforcing a waiver 
of First Amendment rights for the very purpose of insulating public officials from unpleasant attacks 
would plainly undermine that core First Amendment principle.”).  
 192.  Id. at 220. 
 193.  See id.  (“Ashley Overbey sued three officers of Baltimore Police Department (BPD), 
alleging that the officers had beaten, tased, verbally abused, and needlessly arrested her in her own 
home after she called 911 to report a burglary.”).  
 194.  Id.  See generally David A. Graham, The Horror of the Baltimore Police Department, 
ATLANTIC (Aug. 10, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/news/archive/2016/08/the-horror-of-the-
baltimore-police-department/495329/; Jenavieve Hatch, How 2020 Contenders Are Approaching 
Police Brutality and Criminal Justice Reform, HUFFINGTON POST (Jun. 22, 2019), 
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/2020-democrats-police-brutality_n_5d0d079ae4b07ae90d9c99d5. 
 195.  STONE ET AL., supra note 171, at 1016 (citing ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH 
AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 15–16, 24–27, 39 (1948)).  
 196.  Id.; see Overbey, 930 F.3d at 220. 
 197.  STONE ET AL., supra note 172, at 1017. 
 198.  C. Edwin Baker, Autonomy and Free Speech, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 251, 253 (2011).  
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expression, like a right to “persuade or unite or associate with others—or to 
offend . . . them.”199  The notion of personal autonomy and self-fulfillment is 
inextricably linked to notions of self-respect.200 
Further expanding on why First Amendment free speech is crucial to 
self-fulfillment, David A. J. Richards notes: 
The idea here is that people are not to be constrained to 
communicate or not to communicate, to believe or not to believe, 
to associate or not to associate.  The value placed on this cluster of 
ideas derives from the notion of self-respect that comes from a 
mature person’s full and untrammeled exercise of capacities 
central to human rationality.  Thus, the significance of free 
expression rests on the central human capacity to create and 
express symbolic systems, such as speech . . . intended to 
communicate in determinate, complex and subtle ways.  Freedom 
of expression permits and encourages the exercise of these 
capacities: it supports a mature individual’s sovereign autonomy in 
deciding how to communicate with others. . . .  In so doing, it 
nurtures and sustains the self-respect of the mature person.201 
To restrict liberties would be to deny someone the ability to nurture their 
basic sense of self and the autonomy and integrity of their personhood.202 
A number of the Supreme Court’s opinions have echoed the notion that 
free speech is crucial to self-fulfillment.203  In Terminiello, the Court was 
concerned that restricting freedom of speech would lead to a standardization 
of ideas where dominant political or community groups dictate truth and 
opinion.204  Similarly, in Virginia v. Hicks, the Court emphasized that speech 
restrictions are dangerous because many people would not “undertake the 
considerable burden” to challenge the restriction and would instead just 
choose silence.205  Finally, in Citizens United, the Court also emphasized 
concern about efforts to silence and disadvantage specific voices.206  The 
Court noted that “[b]y taking the right to speak from some and giving it to 
                                                          
 199.  Id. at 254 (“In the formal conception, autonomy consists of a person’s authority (or right) 
to make decisions about herself—her own meaningful actions and usually her use of her resources—
as long as her actions do not block others’ similar authority or rights.  This formal autonomy in 
relation to one’s self does not include any right to exercise power over others.  It does, however, 
encompass self-expressive rights that include, for example, a right to seek to persuade or unite or 
associate with others—or to offend, expose, condemn, or disassociate with them.”).  
 200.  David A. J. Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of the 
First Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 45, 62 (1974).  
 201.  Id.   
 202.  Id.  
 203.  See infra notes 204–214 and accompanying text.  
 204.  Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1949). 
 205.  Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119 (2003). 
 206.  Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010).  
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others, the Government deprives the disadvantaged person or class of the 
right to use speech to strive to establish worth, standing, and respect for the 
speakers voice.”207   
The notion of self-respect is also consistent with the court’s rejection of 
the City’s argument that Overbey was exercising her right not to speak.208  
The right not to speak is rooted in protection from government compulsion 
of speech, as the court noted, and therefore is not applicable when the 
government entices an individual to silence.209  Here, the City’s offered 
“option” to not speak did not protect Overbey from government pressure to 
speak something she did not believe.210  Instead, the City sought to compel 
Overbey’s silence to limit her critique of the City itself, the exact concern 
raised in Citizens United.211  By maintaining Overbey’s right to free speech, 
the Court rooted its concern for her First Amendment right in the societal 
interest in “individual freedom of mind.”212 
Beyond the importance of freedom of speech in the functioning of 
democracy, the court’s reasoning also emphasized a danger posed by the use 
of non-disparagement clauses in police brutality statements.213  The danger 
alluded to by the court is the danger that arises from governments using their 
power to limit critiques by silencing individuals.214 
C. The Court’s Opinion Affirmed the Importance of Government-
Critical Speech Protections for Individuals from Marginalized 
Communities 
The court’s emphasis on protecting government-critical speech and the 
emphasis on principles of personal autonomy and self-fulfillment underlying 
the First Amendment have major implications on speech protections for 
members of marginalized communities.215  The court’s decision comes while 
the United States is in the midst of a social movement to address systematic 
                                                          
 207.  Id. at 340–341 (noting that “the Government may commit a constitutional wrong when by 
law it identifies certain preferred speakers”).  
 208.  Overbey v. Mayor of Baltimore, 930 F.3d 215, 222–23 (4th Cir. 2019) 
 209.  Id.  
 210.  Id.  
 211.  Id.; Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 340–41. 
 212.  Overbey, 930 F.3d at 225. 
 213.  See Richards, supra note 200, at 60 (stating that the moral theory underlying the First 
Amendment includes “[t]he central intuitive features of morality are mutual respect—treating others 
as you would like to be treated in comparable circumstances; universalization—judging the morality 
of principles by the consequences of their universal application; and minimization of fortuitous 
human differences, like clan, caste, ethnicity, and color, as a basis for differential treatment.” 
(footnotes omitted)).  
 214.  See id.  
 215.  See id.  
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racism and police brutality against Black individuals.216  While these issues 
were not collectively before the court as it decided Overbey, its reasoning 
will hold important implications as it relates to free speech and identity.217  
As asserted in the previous section, the goal of individual autonomy underlies 
freedom of speech protections, yet non-disparagement agreements in police 
brutality settlements impede on individual autonomy.218  The non-
disparagement clauses for police brutality interfere with individual autonomy 
in two significant ways: They (1) like in sexual harassment settlements, 
prevent individuals from sharing experiences and (2) disproportionately 
impact historically underprivileged populations and minimize their 
autonomy when at odds with government power.219 
First, government speech restrictions are at odds with the First 
Amendment’s goal of self-fulfillment and personal autonomy because they 
silence someone from sharing negative experiences when their rights have 
been violated.220  Free speech should not be constrained by whether it is to 
be believed or associated with, because “the notion of self-respect that comes 
from a mature person’s full and untrammeled exercise of capacities” is 
“central to human rationality.”221  Non-disclosure agreements in sexual 
harassment settlements present a parallel to their use in police brutality 
settlements.222  While different in scope, non-disparagement clauses have 
been recently criticized in the context of sexual harassment.223  Similar to the 
                                                          
 216.  See Niraj Chokshi, How #BlackLivesMatter Came to Define a Movement, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 22, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/23/us/how-blacklivesmatter-came-to-define-a-
movement.html (“The hashtag had a small, but sustained increase in use in the summer of 2014, 
when Michael Brown and Eric Garner died in encounters with the police, focusing a national 
discussion on race and policing and elevating a phrase that would define a movement.”).  
 217.  See infra notes 218–262 and accompanying text.  
 218.  Richards, supra note 200, at 60, 62. 
 219.  See infra notes 239–262 and accompanying text.  
 220.  See Richards, supra note 200, at 62 (“Freedom of expression . . . supports a mature 
individual’s sovereign autonomy in deciding how to communicate with others . . . [and] disfavors 
restrictions on communication imposed for the sake of the distortion rigidities of the orthodox and 
the established.”).  
 221.  Id.; see Baker, supra note 198, at 254 (stating that autonomy encompasses the right to “seek 
to persuade or united or associate with other—or to offend, expose, condemn, or disassociate with 
them”).  
 222.  See Hoffman & Lampmann, Hushing Contracts, 97 WASH. U. L. REV. 165, 167–68 (2019) 
(discussing the impact of the #MeToo movement on “hush contracts”).  Notably, concern over hush 
contracts in sexual harassment contexts may also be impacted by the court’s reasoning in Overbey 
because of the City’s use of non-disparagement agreements in sexual harassment settlements.  
Forced Silence Condones Police Violence, ACLU MD. (accessed Nov. 17, 2019), https://www.aclu-
md.org/en/campaigns/forced-silence-condones-police-violence (“This is a systemic problem in 
Baltimore City that deeply harms women and communities of color.”). 
 223.  See, e.g., Hoffman & Lampmann, supra note 222, at 169 (“After collecting information 
from a variety of sources and disciplines, we argue that not only do hush contracts encourage 
specific acts of repeated (and spiraling) misconduct, but also they can corrupt entire organizations 
and communities.”(footnotes omitted)); Vasundhara Prasad, If Anyone Is Listening, #MeToo: 
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current public discourse around police brutality, the country is also in the 
midst of the #MeToo social movement.224  The #MeToo movement has raised 
awareness about the different types of sexual violence, including sexual 
harassment, that (predominantly) women experience.225  #MeToo has come 
up significantly in employment cases where women claim they have been 
sexually harassed by their usually male employers.226  A number of scholars 
have raised concerns about the use of non-disparagement clauses in 
settlements for sexual harassment.227  For instance, one scholar identified 
that, while non-disparagement clauses may have beneficial purposes, they 
can be “incredibly pernicious contracts” in the context of sexual violence.228  
In the context of sexual violence, these contracts require oversight because 
they raise considerable public policy concerns over the freedom of speech 
and “the public’s interest in knowing about these repeat sexual offenders.”229  
These “contracts of silence” are concerning when used to silence individuals 
from sharing their experiences.230  Another scholar noted that, given the 
current social moment, “[p]ublic disclosures of contractual secrets are giving 
breach a good name.”231   
A number of states have proposed legislation to protect individuals 
impacted by sexual harassment who must choose between settlement and 
sharing their experiences.232  A New York bill prohibited non-disclosure 
agreements in sexual harassment settlements unless it was the complainant’s 
preference.233  A California bill made it unlawful for employers to use non-
disclosure clauses in sexual harassment settlements.234  Concerns about 
silencing contracts reflect the existing concern that someone with great power 
may demand silence and force an individual with less power to choose 
                                                          
Breaking the Culture of Silence Around Sexual Abuse Through Regulating Non-Disclosure 
Agreements and Secret Settlements, 59 B.C. L. REV. 2507, 2509 (2018) (“[B]ecause the most 
egregious offenders of sexual assault and sexual harassment prohibit victims from speaking out 
through the brazen use of NDAs, courts should take a heightened role in determining whether such 
agreements are enforceable as a matter of law.”). 
 224.  See, e.g., Hoffman & Lampmann, supra note 222, at 167–68; Prasad, supra note 223, at 
2508–09. 
 225.  Prasad, supra note 223, at 2510–11.  
 226.  Id.  
 227.  See infra note 228–231 and accompanying text.  
 228.  Prasad, supra note 223, at 2508.  
 229.  Id. at 2508–09.  
 230.  See supra note 225 and accompanying text. 
 231.  Hoffman & Lampmann, supra note 222, at 167.  
 232.  Id. at 168, 188.  
 233.  Id. at 168.  
 234.  Id. at 188.  
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between silence and speech.235  For this reason, the concern over silence in 
sexual harassment settlements should extend to the settlements over police 
brutality.236  Police brutality settlements are arguably even more concerning 
because the entity silencing speech is the government itself.237  The 
government eliminates criticism from the community and limits an 
individual’s opportunity for self-fulfillment.238 
Second, the City’s use of non-disparagement clauses in settlements for 
police brutality, as indicated by the court’s reasoning, will further silence and 
deny self-fulfillment to members of marginalized communities.239  Concerns 
about personal autonomy and silencing speech are supported by the 
disproportionate impact of police use of force on minorities and the struggle 
of marginalized individuals to assert their rights.240  Research shows that 
police misconduct disproportionately impacts Black community members.241  
Black individuals are overpoliced, more likely to experience force from 
police, and more likely to be killed by police.242  A 2015 survey found that 
unarmed Black individuals were more than two times as likely as white 
individuals to be killed by police.243  Beyond killings, Black individuals are 
                                                          
 235.  See Prasad, supra note 223, at 2510 (noting the “public scrutiny over the widespread use 
of NDAs by individuals in positions of power to silence the victims they have sexually abused or 
sexually harassed” (footnote omitted)). 
 236.  See id.  
 237.  See Overbey v. Mayor of Baltimore, 930 F.3d 215, 224 (4th Cir. 2019) (noting that speech 
protection is warranted here “because the non-disparagement clause is a government-defined and 
government-enforced restriction on government-critical speech”).  
 238.  Richards, supra note 200, at 62. 
 239.  See Richards, supra note 200, at 60 (“The central intuitive features of morality are mutual 
respect treating others as you would like to be treated in comparable circumstances; universalization 
judging the morality of principles by the consequences of their universal application; and 
minimization of fortuitous human differences, like clan, caste, ethnicity, and color, as a basis for 
differential treatment.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 240.  See infra notes 241–251 and accompanying text. 
 241.  See generally Radley Balko, There’s Overwhelming Evidence That the Criminal-Justice 
System is Racist. Here’s the Proof, WASH. POST (Sept. 18, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/opinions/wp/2018/09/18/theres-overwhelming-evidence-
that-the-criminal-justice-system-is-racist-heres-the-proof/. 
 242.  See id. (compiling research on the ways Black individuals are more often impacted by 
policing and profiling); ELIZABETH DAVIS ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CONTACTS BETWEEN 
POLICE AND THE PUBLIC, 2015, at 1, 17 (2018), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpp15.pdf 
(finding that Black individuals were more likely to experiences use of force than white individuals); 
Frank Edwards et al., Risk of Being Killed by Police Use of Force in the United States by Age, Race-
Ethnicity, and Sex, 116 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S.A., 16793, 16794 (2019) (finding that Black 
men and boys had the highest rates of being killed by police).  
 243.  Jon Swaine et al., Black Americans Killed by Police Twice as Likely to Be Unarmed as 
White People, GUARDIAN (June 1, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2015/jun/01/black-americans-killed-by-police-analysis (finding that that thirty-two percent of 
Black people were unarmed when killed by police, making them two times more likely to be 
unarmed than white people).  
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more likely to experience the threat or use of physical force by police than 
white individuals, with the majority perceiving the threat or use of force to 
be excessive.244  Individuals experiencing excessive police force described 
being pushed, grabbed, kicked, and targeted with a gun.245 
When police impose speech restrictions on Black individuals who have 
been subject to this brutality, their voices are silenced.246  Black experiences 
are eliminated from public discourse.247  As Richards noted on self-
fulfillment, “people are not to be constrained to communicate or not to 
communicate” and self-respect is only achieved with “a mature person’s full 
and untrammeled exercise of capacities central to human rationality.”248 
Society requires basic opportunities and an equal distribution of rights 
for all individuals to fully embrace the liberties linked with personal 
autonomy and self-respect.249  Therefore, when speech is restricted in a way 
that disproportionately impacts individuals who have been denied equal 
rights in other respects, there is even greater concern about the impact on 
personal autonomy.250  Use of non-disparagement clauses by police to 
prevent Black community members from sharing the ways their rights have 
been violated continues to subjugate these community members and deny 
them the opportunity for self-fulfillment through representation in the 
political and societal discourse.251 
The concern over non-disparagement clauses in police settlements and 
their impact on marginalized communities is further exacerbated by the 
problem noted by the Court in Hicks.252  In Hicks, the Court emphasized the 
burden in attempting to assert one’s rights can be substantial.253  There is an 
even greater burden for marginalized individuals.254  Non-disparagement 
clauses make it even harder for marginalized individuals to share their 
experiences.255  Individuals who have the least power to challenge 
                                                          
 244.  Davis et al., supra note 242, at 17. 
 245.  Id. at 16.  
 246.  See Garfield, supra note 4, at 264 (noting with concern that “[c]ontracts of silence are being 
used effectively to keep relevant and possibly important information out of the public domain”).  
 247.  Id.  
 248.  Richards, supra note 200, at 62. 
 249.  Id. at 63.  
 250.  See id. at 62 (“The value placed on this cluster of ideas derives from the notion of self-
respect that comes from a mature person’s full and untrammeled exercise of capacities central to 
human rationality.”).  
 251.  See id.  
 252.  Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119 (2003). 
 253.  Id.  
 254.  Id.  
 255.  Id.; see also Risk of Being Killed by Police Use of Force in the United States, supra note 
243 (“Baltimore City officials require victims of police brutality to sign ‘gag orders’ banning them 
from telling their own stories in order to resolve their cases.”).  
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restrictions to their free speech are those most unable to take on the 
“considerable burden” when their rights are challenged.256  This burdening 
problem was plainly evidenced by Overbey’s own experience of being 
physical violated and charged with committing a crime.257  Afterwards, she 
was unable to find a job because of the criminal charge on her record and 
became homeless.258  When the City made its settlement offer, Overbey was 
in a position of having to settle on their terms or face an even greater burden 
to challenge the terms.259  With Black community members more likely to 
experience police violence, they are then subject to an ongoing cycle that 
requires they meet a heavy burden to assert rights.260  For that reason, they 
may choose not to assert their rights or choose to settle and waive their rights 
out of necessity.261  But, in the process, the City deprives its community 
members of self-fulfillment and autonomy.262 
The court’s decision addressed this impact on self-fulfillment.263  In its 
reasoning, the court shows that personal autonomy and free speech are more 
important than the government’s interest in protecting itself from criticism.264  
Thus, while the case was rightly decided according to Supreme Court 
precedent, the relevance of this opinion extends far beyond a correct 
holding.265  The Overbey opinion highlights that the First Amendment 
operates as a safeguard when the government attempts to use its power to 
silence marginalized populations who choose to share their negative 
experiences with the government publicly.266 
V. CONCLUSION 
In Overbey v. Mayor of Baltimore, the Fourth Circuit held that the City 
of Baltimore could not enforce non-disparagement clauses in settlements for 
                                                          
 256.  Hicks, 539 U.S. at 119.  
 257.  See Overbey v. Mayor of Baltimore, 930 F.3d 215, 220 (4th Cir. 2019) (noting that 
Overbey was “needlessly” charged with a crime, spent two years trying to have her case remedied, 
struggled to find work with the arrest record, and “she and her children became homeless”).  
 258.  Id.  
 259.  Id.  
 260.  See supra note 255–256 and accompanying text.  
 261.  See supra note 257 and accompanying text.  
 262.  Richards, supra note 200, at 62. 
 263.  Overbey, 930 F.3d at 224 (“Indeed, when the government (1) makes a police-misconduct 
claimant’s silence about her claims a condition of settlement; (2) obtains the claimant’s promise of 
silence; (3) retains for itself the unilateral ability to determine whether the claimant has broken her 
promise; and (4) enforces the claimant’s promise by, in essence, holding her civilly liable to itself, 
there can be no serious doubt that the government has used its power in an effort to curb speech that 
is not to its liking.”).  
 264.  See id.  
 265.  See supra notes 197–264 and accompanying text.  
 266.  See supra notes 197–264 and accompanying text. 
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police brutality.267  The court correctly analyzed the balance of First 
Amendment interests underlying free speech with the City’s asserted 
interests in favor of enforcing the agreement.268  The court relied on 
commitments to open debate on public issues and mistrust of government as 
significantly protected interests within the First Amendment.269  The interests 
in freedom of speech have long prevailed over other asserted interests.270  The 
court’s decision was also consistent with the theoretical foundations of the 
First Amendment—the goals of truth, self-governance, and self-
fulfillment.271  In particular, the goals of self-fulfillment and personal 
autonomy were served when the court refused to enforce a settlement to 
purchase silence from a victim of police brutality.272  By using non-
disparagement clauses in police brutality settlements, cases most often 
impacting marginalized community members, the City is effectively 
silencing its own critics and denying their humanity in the process.273  The 
court’s decision to reject this practice sends a clear message: Governments 
cannot silence an individual’s experience to save its own reputation.274 
                                                          
 267.  Overbey, 930 F.3d at 226.  
 268.  See supra Section IV.A.  
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